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ABSTRACT
LAWRENCE, BENJAMIN

Retributive Justice and Standing: A Critique of

State Punishment. Department of Philosophy, March 2011
ADVISOR: Leo Zaibert
This thesis investigates the philosophical justifications of punishment, focusing in
particular on the idea of standing to punish, and how the state can have standing. The two
main doctrines of justifying punishment, retributivism and consequentialism, are
considered. According to retributivism, punishment is justified by the desert of the
wrongdoer, whereas consequentialism contends that punishment is justified by the good
consequences that follow from punishing wrongdoers. This thesis concludes that
retributivism better captures the moral intuitions associated with punishment, and is
better suited to articulating the concept of standing to punish.
Standing to punish can be seen as the “moral authority” of the punisher. In order
to describe how the state can have standing, the Rawlsian social contract is employed.
The social contract shows that the state can have standing to punish through the implicit,
rational consent of citizens to be punished. The conceptual device of subjective rights is
employed in order to show that the contractarian justification of the state's standing to
punish is tied to the socioeconomic equality of society. Ultimately, it is concluded that the
institution of punishment has a moral commitment to punish the guilty, but that the state
does not have the moral standing to punish.
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1. Defining Retributivism and Consequentialism
What does it mean to get what one deserves? Desert motivates some of our most
fundamental modes of moral expression - punishment and reward; judgments of desert
are not only common, they often form the basis, wholly or in part, of entire social
structures. Capitalism, for example, is predicated, in part at least, on the view that wealth
is deserved based on talents, skills, and effort, whereas communism asserts that all people
deserve equal well-being. Even though the appeal of desert is ordinary and intuitive, it
seems to stubbornly resist any attempt at philosophical explanation.
Insofar as punishment and desert are inextricably connected, the former inherits
the conceptual obscurities of the latter. This obscurity has caused the two sides in the
debate over the justification of punishment to be among the most intractable in
philosophy. The two main camps in this debate are consequentialism and retributivism.1
Consequentialism justifies punishment by attending to the alleged good
consequences it achieves. These good consequences can include a broad range of ends,
including happiness, the prevention of suffering, psychological satisfaction, and social
cohesion, among many others. Punishment itself is not seen as a good - since punishment
is the deliberate infliction of suffering, it is viewed as inherently wrong, and so can only
1 The two camps in the philosophy of punishment roughly overlap with two major
camps in ethics as a whole: deontological (Kantian) and teleological (Utilitarian)
ethics. Retributivism corresponds to deontological ethics, consequentialism
corresponds to teleological ethics. Therefore many of the familiar arguments between
teleological and deontological doctrines have analogues in the debate over
punishment.
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be justified if the suffering that comprises it is offset by some other goods. There are
plenty of ways in which those goods can be brought about, but the most commonly cited
ways are deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
Punishment has deterrent value because it discourages further wrongdoing, either
by the wrongdoer herself or others who are aware of the punishment. Thus when the excon refrains from stealing because she wouldn't dare risk returning to prison, or when the
child at school decides not to steal his friend's lunch out of fear of being punished, the
deterrent value of punishment is at work.
Incapacitation is simply the wrongdoer being physically prevented from
committing further crimes. Put simply, a criminal in prison cannot commit any crimes (at
least against the law-abiders outside the prison walls). The case is even more clear within
the context of capital punishment - the executed criminal will commit no more crimes,
death is the ultimate incapacitation.
Rehabilitation is the effect of punishment causing some positive change in the
wrongdoer. This might be achieved in a number of ways. One is by communication given some denunciatory view of punishment, society is expressing its condemnation of
the criminal when he is punished. This could lead to the moral improvement of the
criminal, who realizes the error of his ways. There is also the possibility of more directly
rehabilitative models of punishment, in which criminals are given counseling, training,
job placement programs, and so on, thus giving the criminal the skills and self-esteem to
become a productive, law-abiding member of society.
In contrast to all these consequentialist views, retributivism contends that
punishment is justified by the desert of the wrongdoer. Thus, most retributivists would
2

assert that for one to deserve punishment is a necessary and sufficient condition for one to
be justifiably punished. Though it is thus presented as a straightforward thesis,
retributivism is nonetheless often confused with a variety of other positions; I shall draw
on Michael Moore's work as I show how it differs from these other positions.
1.

Any theory determining the degree of punishment is not retributivism. In

particular, the principle of lex talionis, that an offender's wrong should in turn be inflicted
on her, is often confused with retributivism. The retributivist believes that the wrongdoer
should be punished because she deserves it. What exactly is the amount which is
deserved is a separate question which is important, but needs not concern the
retributivist.2
2.

The theory that desert is merely a necessary condition for just punishment is not

retributivism. On this view, desert has no role in justifying punishment, so it is typically
justified by consequentialist considerations, that is, by the good ends it achieves. Desert
matters here only as a side-constraint, or as a criterion that must be satisfied in order for
punishment to be permissible. Retributivism asserts that desert is both necessary and
sufficient for justified punishment - any good ends achieved by punishment are merely a
happy side-effect. It is worth noting that this view is characteristic of some so-called
“mixed-justifications” of punishment, which attempt to synthesize retributivism and
consequentialism. Because these views trivialize the role of desert in justifying
2

Retributivism and lex talionis are often erroneously combined because of many

philosophers' endorsement of both, including Kant. This may be because retributivism,
unlike consequentialism, has no clear way of determining how much punishment should
be inflicted on wrongdoers. Lex talionis provides a clear solution to this problem.
3

punishment, they are not retributivist.3
3.

The theory that punishment is justified by the psychological satisfaction it

generates in victims with vengeful feelings is not retributivism. Such satisfaction would
be a good end achieved by punishment, so would justify punishment only on
consequentialist grounds. The retributivist does not believe that psychological satisfaction
is the same as the service of justice.4
4.

The theory that punishment is justified because it satisfies the preferences of all

people in society is not retributivism. Similar to the previous theory, this is a
consequentialist justification. Preference satisfaction should not be equated with
satisfaction of desert.
3 The role of desert as a necessary but not sufficient condition for punishment is a
trademark of so-called “mixed-justifications” of punishment. Mixed theories of
punishment claim that punishment as an institution is justified by consequentialist
concerns, but that individuals should be punished because they deserve it. These
theories should be considered versions of consequentialism, since they justify
punishment with consequentialism. These theories' inclusion of desert as a necessary
condition for just punishment does not integrate retributivism in a very meaningful
way because it still fails to express retributivism's main contention: that desert alone
justifies punishment.
4 I will later argue, however, that retributive feelings provide good reason to believe that
deserved punishment is morally good. While psychological satisfaction itself is not
important to the retributivist, the psychology of desert and punishment is nonetheless
important to this paper.
4

5.

The theory that punishment is justified because it prevents vigilantism is not

retributivism. Again, this is a consequentialist consideration. Furthermore, this is limited
to punishment in the context of the state, and thus cannot be seen as a basic theory of the
justification of punishment simpliciter.5
6.

Denunciatory theories of punishment are not retributivist. On such theories,

punishment is a way of expressing society's condemnation of the criminal. Here again,
moral communication is a consequence of punishment. The retributivist wants the
wrongdoer to get what he deserves, even if he learns nothing from it. Consider, for
example, a disgruntled student who, after being humiliated in front of his peers by his
teacher, punishes his teacher by 'keying' her car. It would be awkward to describe this
action as communicative, since the teacher won't even know who was responsible for the
damage to her car - it is much more plausible that the student simply believes that his
teacher deserves to suffer for her cruelty.
7.

The theory that like cases must be treated alike is not retributivism. Such a theory

demands that two offenders who have committed the same wrong must be punished the
same. But retributivism is a theory of a prior consideration - why the offender should be
punished. The theory that like cases must be treated alike could be appended to any
5 In fact, the retributivist would probably have less of an issue with vigilantism than the
consequentialist. Vigilantism is generally opposed because it poses a threat to an
orderly society. But threats to societal order carry much more weight in the
consequentialist analysis of punishment than the retributivist. The retributivist could,
however, oppose the vigilante on moral grounds, due to a possible lack of standing on
the vigilante's part (see p. 8).
5

justification of punishment.
These other theories are sometimes mislabeled as retributivism because they share
some superficial characteristics or connotations with pure retributivism. But they all
make one of two mistakes: confusing the standards of inflicting punishment with the
justification of punishment (as in the case of the equivocation of lex talionis and
retributivism), or seeing some consequence of punishment as a retributivist reason to
punish. Such mistakes distort the real meaning of retributivism and, especially the latter
the case, blur the line between consequentialism and retributivism, thus confusing any
conceptual investigation of the two justifications; it should be made clear that the two are
radically different.
Retributivism justifies punishment through the desert of the offender. But the
retributivist is not committed to valuing the giving of just deserts over all else. Certainly,
the retributivist believes that we have a duty to punish the guilty, but that duty is not in
the radical category of Kant's “perfect duties” (nor is any other). Punishing the guilty is
simply one moral duty along with, and possibly competing with, many others - this
position is what I will call a “minimal version” of retributivism.
2. Standing to Punish
I have thus far been occupied with the theories which tell us, “why are we justified
in punishing?” But I will now venture into somewhat less well-charted territory by
looking at the question. “why are we justified in punishing?” This question is definitely a
part of ordinary moral thinking - we intuitively believe that the government should not
punish people who cheat at board games, civilians should not punish each other for
crimes, and perhaps no one should punish a person for not trying to fulfill his or her full
6

potential, though in all three cases punishment may be deserved. I will investigate this
question, focusing in particular on whether or not the state is justified in punishing - a
question that remains unanswered in ethics, but generally goes unasked.
Since consequentialism and retributivism are such radically different theories,
apparently sharing no common ground for compromise, desert and punishment continue
to be amongst those controversial concepts underlying our major political institutions.
While the battle over how punishment is justified has gone on for centuries among
scholars, punishment has persisted unchallenged as a state fixture. How has the institution
of punishment remained unquestioned in the practical level when it sits on such unstable
justificatory foundations? It is perhaps because the philosophical discourse on
punishment has remained in large part insulated from political and social facts. For most
people, it would seem odd to assert that an institution as clear and established as
punishment is in need of justification, so the debate over punishment in philosophy may
seem, to some, like a rather abstruse and theoretical activity with no real connection to
real-life problems. Skyrocketing incarceration rates in the US make it clear, now, that the
reverse is true. The legal institution of punishment is bereft of a clear justificatory
foundation, and so has spiraled out of control through a cycle of political competition to
increase punishment and demonize criminals. The public is in dire need, then, of a
common understanding of how punishment is justified.
This paper will not attempt to tackle the Gargantuan task of justifying state
punishment, but will rather examine the available justifications and see how well they fit
with other values that members of the American society also cherish; I am in particular
concerned with the question of the state's moral standing to punish. Standing can be
7

understood as moral authority to punish, which should be distinguished from institutional
authority (henceforth referred to as “authority”), which is a non-moral aspect of
institutions. I will illustrate the concept of standing with which I am concerned, by
discussing the four possible combinations of standing and authority.
The first case is that in which the punisher has both standing and authority; a
teacher fairly punishing an unruly student would satisfy these conditions. Then there is
the case is one in which the punisher has neither authority nor standing. Imagine a student
who is a constant source of trouble in the classroom. When one of his classmates talks out
of turn in class, this student berates him angrily. Here, the unruly student has no authority,
as the authority to punish in the classroom is reserved for the teacher, and he has no
standing, since his own indiscretions have caused him to forfeit his moral right to be an
arbiter of such moral issues in class. A case of standing without authority would be the
righteous vigilante. Because the punishment doled out by the vigilante is extralegal, by
definition, she lacks the authority to punish. However, assuming that her methods are
effective and her motives are virtuous (to protect the innocent, to champion justice, etc.),
the vigilante has moral standing to punish. A case of authority without standing would be
the father who punishes his child for dabbling in recreational drug use, though he himself
experimented with drugs at the same age. This father's standing may be in doubt, even if
his son's drug use is wrong, because he may not be a moral position to punish his son,
even though he does have the authority as a parent.
In this section, I am not interested in the question of when punishment justified,
but rather, assuming that punishment is indeed justified, in the question of when the state
actually has the standing to administer it. But though there is a prima facie distinction
8

between standing and justification, it is conceptually difficult to draw. Imagine another
case - John confronts his girlfriend, Jane, on the street after finding out about her
infidelity. A passerby, Paul, hears the exchange, and, feeling that Jane deserves to be
punished, Paul slaps her. Though Jane should have been punished for her unfaithfulness
(either because she deserved it or because she would learn a lesson), Paul certainly lacked
standing to administer it. Clearly Paul shouldn't have punished Jane, but was this case of
punishment unjustified?
The consequentialist would have great difficulty articulating why Paul shouldn't
have slapped Jane. Suppose that his punishment were to produce bad consequences, since
John and Jane would both be furious at Paul's presumptuousness. In such a case, the
punishment would simply be unjustified. This is an unsatisfactory result because it fails
to capture the intuitive idea of standing - Jane should have been punished, but not by
Paul. Perhaps Paul's punishment would in fact produce good consequences - then the
consequentialist would certainly be committed to saying that Paul's actions were justified.
In either case, if the consequentialist wants to explain why Paul shouldn't have punished,
she will likely resort to a system of rules or conceptual placeholders.
As I said, Paul's lack of standing would be reflected in a consequentialist
calculation. After all, John and Jane would both be furious. The consequentialist might
claim, then, that the intuitive idea of standing is a conceptual placeholder for the class of
bad consequences that would arise when the wrong person punishes. I am skeptical of
this move. The consequentialist cannot easily divide consequences into different classes,
with each class embodying an ordinary moral concept. Suppose, for example, that a hardboiled ex-marine has his family killed by his unhinged former-friend-and-fellow-marine9

turned-rival. Ex-marine wants to punish his rival, but he doesn't want to get the police
involved, since he considers this a personal vendetta. It seems that the consequentialist
would have to claim that the police do not have standing, since all parties involved would
be upset at the interference of the police. This is not a satisfactory result - the police do
have standing as a matter of moral fact. The opinions and values of those involved (i.e.
the ex-marine's sense of personal honor) do not affect who has actual moral standing. I
think this situation demonstrates why this consequentialist move fails.
The retributivist fares better, but understanding why will require a more in-depth
understanding of both consequentialism and retributivism. I will show that understanding
the nature of desert can explain our intuitive notions of standing, whereas
consequentialism, being focused exclusively on consequences, has serious trouble
articulating individual rights, which are the key to understanding the problem of standing.
I will proceed, then, with a more in-depth discussion of both retributivism and
consequentialism, in which I will contend that some version of retributivism is
indispensable in justifying punishment. I will begin with a critique of consequentialism,
followed by a defense of retributivism. My goal is to prove that the justification of
punishment requires at least a minimal version of retributivism. Having established this
retributivist foundation, I will use the tools of retributivism to discuss a problem of
standing in political punishment.
3. Justifying Punishment
Of the two justifications of punishment, consequentialism is the forward-looking
one. Rather than looking backward and focusing on the wrongdoing of an offender, like
retributivism, it instead only looks to the future and justifies punishment by the good
10

consequences it produces. Because of this, consequentialism is often seen as the more
progressive ideology. I will show that there are, in fact, some fundamental flaws in
consequentialism. There are many reasons to doubt that punishment, at least as legal
institution, does in fact produce good consequences like deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation. America's prison system makes a strong case for the negative effects of
punishment, as the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, and is
nowhere near the lowest crime rate.6 But though there is much to be said about the
(negative) effects of legal punishment on society, I will focus on the theoretical side of
the issue. After all, we cannot weigh the importance of consequences until it is
determined how important consequences are to the justification of punishment.
I will note, however, that even if we ultimately reject consequentialism, the
consequences of punishment are always worth consideration. I am not advocating an
extreme version of retributivism that would endorse punishing the guilty even at the most
catastrophic expense. But if I am right in arguing that retributivism is a stronger theory
than consequentialism, then retributivism presents us a set of moral duties that must be
weighed alongside consequences when justifying punishment.
A typical objection to consequentialist ethics in general, the scapegoat problem, is
also a classic objection to consequentialist justifications of punishment. The objection is
this: imagine a there is a crime, and the public is outraged. Society is on the brink of
rioting and upheaval, and the only way to appease the people is to punish the offender.
But since the offender can't be caught, the only way to placate the people is to punish an
6 The Sentencing Project, “New Incarceration Figures”
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_newfigures.pdf
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innocent person, while claiming that they are the offender. Since the suffering of the one
innocent person being punished would be outweighed by the benefit to society, this
instance of punishment would be justified by consequentialism. In a cases like this, then,
consequentialism justifies punishing the innocent. Punishing the innocent is wrong, so
consequentialism can lead us to make wrong decisions.
There are two typical responses from a consequentialist to an argument such as
this. The first would be to claim that punishing the innocent is not punishment at all. This
move counts as what H.L.A. Hart called the “definitional stop”.7 Consequentialism
justifies inflicting suffering on the innocent; even if it is not called punishment, it is still
none the less a problem for the theory. The second response would be some form of rule
consequentialism. In rule consequentialism, each individual act is not gauged to be right
or wrong, but rather is subjected to a certain set of rules. These rules are formulated based
on consequentialist concerns, so there would be a rule like, “don't punish the innocent,”
since allowing punishment of the innocent, in general, is worse for everyone than
disallowing it. However, this strikes me as the wrong reason for not punishing the
innocent. The innocent should not be punished because of individual rights, not because
of consequentialist rules. Consequentialism's inability to articulate rights is a flaw for the
theory in every case, not just punishing the innocent.8
7 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (2008), pp 5-6.
8 I will remind the reader again that consequences are always morally relevant. If
retributivism is correct, then we have a moral duty to punish the guilty. But we also
have many other moral duties, like the duty to minimize the suffering of others. I am
not out to prove that consequences never matter, but I do want to show that some of
12

I don't want to elaborate too much on the specific system of rights to which I'm
alluding. Simply put, the consequentialist view of moral responsibilities is comprised
solely of the pleasure and pain caused by actions. This view fails to capture our actual
moral views. In our ordinary interactions, we need to consider not only the pleasure and
pain caused by our actions, but also what W.D. Ross calls “prima facie duties”.9 Based on
circumstances, different of these duties may have greater or lesser weight, and the relative
strength of these duties determines what action is right. When I refer to the rights of an
individual, I have in mind the prima facie duties that others have towards the individual.
In this system of rights, consequences matter because they are part of the circumstances
that make duties relatively more or less important, but unlike consequentialism, actions
are ultimately right because of duties, not consequences.
Because consequentialism ignores desert and rights, it actually has very little
connection to wrongdoing at all. The consequentialist does not see the wrongdoer qua
wrongdoer, but rather sees the wrongdoer as a means to an end. Even in the case of
punishing the guilty, this is a problem for consequentialism. Consider an adolescent who
shoplifts from a pharmacy. In the consequentialist process of justifying punishment of
this adolescent, at no point is it relevant what the offender has done. Thus the
consequentialist could justify the death penalty for the shoplifter, given that it would
produce enough good consequences (by deterring other shoplifters).
Punishment is a response to wrongdoing. So it is a serious problem for a
justificatory theory of punishment not to refer at all to the wrong that was done.
our duties, like the duty to punish, cannot be cashed out in terms of consequences.
9 W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Indianapolis: Hackett Pub, 1988
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Consequentialism does refer to future wrongs, but it is wrong to punish people for future
wrongs. For example, imagine an innocent man in a certain demographic, who lives in a
certain place, and has certain characteristics such that he is statistically almost certain to
commit crimes. The consequentialist punishes wrongdoers on the grounds that they, and
others, are likely to commit more crimes in the future, so why not punish this innocent
man if he, too, is likely to commit crimes? The consequentialist cannot argue otherwise
because consequentialist justifications are only minimally connected to wrongdoing.
One could then argue that consequentialism is hardly interested in punishment at
all, since it is hardly interested in wrongdoing. This is not to say that consequentialist
concerns are unimportant in punishment; it is clear that ignoring consequences entirely
could lead down a dangerous road. But it is also clear that a theory of justifying
punishment that is monofocused on consequences does not agree with what we think
about punishment - one of the most fundamental qualities of punishment is that it is for a
wrong; thus a justification of punishment must explain why the wrong creates a moral
reason to punish.10 It does not follow from this failure of consequentialism, however, that
retributivism is the correct theory. Retributivism is backward-looking, as it focuses
entirely on wrongdoing and the desert it accrues, and so it is often seen as barbaric and
mindlessly vengeful. It remains to be seen how desert is connected to morality, which is
the central task of justifying retributivism. Retributivism is the foundation for my
eventual comments on standing, so I will provide that justification.
I will again draw on Moore's work in defending retributivism. The argument has
10 John Gardner, in his “Introduction” to Punishment and Responsibility, H.L.A. Hart,
Oxford, Oxford University Press (2008). p. xxv
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two main parts. First, I will point out how our moral intuitions agree with retributivism,
thus answering the affirmative the question, “is it virtuous to have retributive emotions?”
Second, I will bridge the gap between retributive emotions and morality, thus establishing
that not only is it virtuous to have retributive feelings, but that those feelings function as
guides to objective moral truths. Ultimately, then, I will have shown that retributive
feelings give us good reason to believe that retributivism justifies punishment. So the
argument begins with an appeal to intuition. I have already discussed, in my critique of
consequentialism, how consequentialism fails to capture the essential intuitive connection
between punishment and wrongdoing. In retributivism, desert makes that connection, and
retributive emotions are the indicators of desert. When one witnesses some wrongful act,
for one to experience retributive feelings, moral indignation and the desire to punish, is
not only the normal response, it is the virtuous one.11 This point becomes clear in a case
when the wrongdoing is one's own - the virtuous response is clearly to feel guilty.
Imagine the emotional state of a murderer. It is strange, in a way, to talk about a more or
less virtuous murderer, but it seems that the murderer who feels no remorse is a worse
figure than the murderer wracked with guilt who turns himself in. It would be incoherent
to accept that self-directed retributive feelings are virtuous, while maintaining that otherregarding retributive feelings are not. The only plausible way to maintain such a position
would be by claiming that retributive feelings can only be self-directed because our
ability to judge others' mental states is fallible, thus we do not have the right to judge
11 Note that I do not exclude the possibility of other emotional responses to wrongdoing.
However, I will focus on retributive feelings, since they are exclusively associated
with responses to wrongdoing.
15

others. I reject this position because everything from passing blame to everyday social
interactions would be impossible if we were not able to judge the mental states of others.
I think, then, that doubting our ability to judge others' mental states is a radical position
that I need not discuss more.
Consider another thought experiment: After the end of the war, a high-ranking
Nazi official escapes to Argentina, and is found until years later. He is found living
happily with his family in Argentina, and he is ostensibly a reformed man. Suppose it is
true that there will be more harm than good in punishing the officer - he, his family, and
his community will be hurt if he is punished, and the time since the war has dimmed the
public's desire for vengeance. Should he then be left in peace when he is found? I am
inclined to say no; this is because the Nazi official deserves to be punished for the
atrocities he has committed. The alternative would be to absolve him simply because he
has gone on to lead a happy, and productive, life. Getting away with murder is no reason
not to punish.
In summation, the first thought experiment, of the murderer who does or does not
feel guilty, was meant to show that retributive feelings are virtuous, and that it is justified
to feel retributive feelings towards both the self and others. The second thought
experiment, concerning the Nazi official, showed that retributive feelings or emotions
remain forceful even when consequentialist reasons for punishing run out. If one agrees
with these conclusions, then the stage is set for the second part of the argument, which is
showing the connection between retributive feelings and moral truths.
The second part of Moore's defense of retributivism is his claim that emotions
should be seen as “heuristic guides” to moral truths. On this view, emotions are not
16

essential in discovering what, say, justice is, nor are they to be seen as infallible
indicators. In fact, it is possible to make moral judgments without any reference to
emotions at all. Consider a case of theft: using observation and inference, someone could
recognize the victim's ownership of some property and the thief's taking of said property,
thus having the tools to attribute culpability to the thief. But such a moral judgment
would be an impoverished one, as recognizing responsibility alone does not generate the
acute sense of wrongness that accompanies an emotionally charged response to
wrongdoing. Thus when it comes to recognizing the actual rightness or wrongness of an
action, emotions are at least powerful guides. Given that emotions are powerful tools in
recognizing moral truths, it follows that the emotions normally felt in response to
wrongdoing, namely, retributive emotions, point to real moral truths.
That is not to say that emotions are infallible, or that they are proof of moral
truths. Moore admits, for example, that homophobia can be seen as a negative emotional
response to homosexuality, which would suggest that homosexuality is wrong. But
emotions alone are not sufficient for determining moral truths - emotions should always
be checked by reason and impartiality. For example, we find murder to be abhorrent, but
there are also good, rational reasons for believing that murder is wrong. Thus we should
conclude that murder is wrong because a number of heuristic guides to moral truth agree
in finding murder wrong. The mere fallibility of some heuristic is no reason to reject it.
Our sense of sight is fallible, but we do not reject it as a tool for discovering truth out of
hand because it is mostly reliable and certainly valuable. The same is so with retributive
feelings.
4. State Standing and The Social Contract
17

In the immediately preceding section I argued that retributive feelings are natural
and intuitive, and that they are heuristic guides to moral truths. In earlier sections, I
argued that consequentialism has serious flaws in justifying punishment. It is wrong to
ignore wrongdoing and desert when justifying punishment. My arguments above, then,
lead us to accept retributivism, and if we do, then we have the tools to finally explain
standing. In the second part of this thesis, I will explore the idea of standing, especially as
it relates to political punishment. I will explore how the social contract and retributivist
justifications of punishment can give the state standing to punish, and it will emerge from
this exploration that certain conditions must be actual in order for the state to have
standing to punish.
In legal judgments, standing is never a part of the equation. Punishing a criminal
requires only the authority of the state - a criminal could not claim, for example, that the
state cannot morally punish her because the state has killed many more people in wars,
and thus lacks the standing to punish killers at home. Once authority is present, standing
fades into irrelevance. So it is clear how an institution of punishment could lose its moral
grounding, yet maintain power and authority. The potential for the dissolution of standing
without any effect on authority runs counter to our moral intuitions, since standing
actually seems more important than authority. I will illustrate this point utilizing the wellknown thought-experiment of a desert island.
Imagine a group of strangers shipwrecked on an island. They are in an
environment without institutions, thus no one has the authority to punish the others. But
each may have different degrees of standing. If the strangers were to designate a leader of
the group, it is likely that they would grant that authority to the individual with the
18

highest standing. Suppose one of the strangers heroically saved several others when the
ship sank; the others assume that he has a strong moral character, so they unanimously
designate him the leader based on this assumed standing. A set of laws is carved into a
stone, and order arises from the initial anarchy of their situation. So which is more
meaningful - the laws on the rock, or the standing of the leader? Clearly it is the latter. If
the leader turns out to be a tyrant, then he forfeits his standing and the others will surely
depose him. On the other hand, if some miscreant scratches off the words from the rock,
the people on the island won't suddenly disregard the position of the leader. This is
because the rock is only a symbol; the leader's standing is what really gives weight to his
legal powers.
Looking at the relative importance of standing and authority, there is a clear
asymmetry between the actual state and the imaginary island state I have just introduced.
It is perhaps because the island leader's authority has not been cemented by time, culture,
and tradition. The laws on the rock are nothing like the actual government, which is vast,
complex, and filled with pomp and ritual. The average citizen, mostly alienated from the
internal processes of government, is nothing like the island-dweller, each of whom had a
personal hand in the laws' inception. The islanders don't see their government with any
particular reverence or fear; the actual citizen rarely questions his government's authority.
Perhaps these facts explain, psychologically, how the importance of standing diminishes
as one moves from the desert island to Washington.
But while standing may seem invisible in actual government, it is not necessarily
impossible to identify. The standing of a just institution is certainly harder to articulate
than that of the island leader, but it can be identified with the right tools. A closer look at
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the standing of the island leader, who is an individual but also represents an institution of
sorts, will serve as an intermediate step towards articulating the standing of an institution.
Recall the earlier example of the arguing John and Jane, and the intrusive Paul. Paul's
lack of standing is intuitively obvious - he knows neither party and he has little
knowledge of the situation, so he clearly has no business interfering with John and Jane's
private dispute. Now consider a similar dispute amongst a pair of islanders, Island-Man
and Island-Woman. Suppose that the island leader knows as little of the dispute between
Island-Man and Island-Woman as Paul knows of the dispute between John and Jane. I
would like to claim that island leader has the standing to interfere in Island-Man and
Island Woman's dispute. Why does the leader have this standing when his situation is
ostensibly analogous to that of Paul? It may seem that the perceived standing of the
leader is really just his authority. But as we have seen, authority alone has little weight
without standing. The leader does in fact have standing, and it stems from his elected
position. By choosing the leader, the islanders willingly give the leader the right to
punish. The leader's standing, then, comes from the consent of the people.12
Fleshing out this assertion will be a lengthy process, but I would like to precede
that by elaborating on the reasons why this discussion of standing is unintelligible to the
consequentialist. The consequentialist is committed to saying that punishment is justified
12 In our own society, of course, we do not think the state has standing to interfere in our
private affairs, such as marital disputes. But on the imaginary island, the islanders are
more concerned with preserving order within the fledgling state than citizens are in the
real world. So we can see how the desires of the people (islanders prefer order, real
people prefer autonomy) affect the standing of the state.
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if it produces good consequences. The intuitive idea of standing is that punishment may
be justified, but not for just any punisher - only a punisher with standing may justifiably
punish. Standing is conceptually incompatible with consequentialism, then, because the
idea of standing is not concerned with consequences. As said before, a consequentialist
analysis of punishment might indicate the illusion of standing - to return to the case of
John and Jane, if Paul were to interfere, then there would be bad consequences due to
Paul's intrusiveness. But to say that consequentialism can thus accommodate the idea of
standing would be a mistake. A goal of this thesis is to examine punishment in a way that
broadly agrees with our intuitive response to punishment. Standing is, I believe, essential
to that intuitive response. I think an effective approach to ethics captures basic moral
emotions and intuitions because, as I claimed in the section on retributivism, feelings
serve as heuristic guides to moral truth. Standing, like desert, is evidenced by the moral
conscience. Consequentialism can only identify a lack of standing insofar as it produces
bad consequences, but if standing is a fundamental moral aspect of punishment, then
punishment without standing is unjustified regardless of consequences, just as is
undeserved punishment. Because it is examining standing, this paper necessarily adopts a
retributivist view.
The example of the shipwrecked strangers is a form of the well-known
philosophical construct of the state of nature. In Leviathan, Hobbes imagined a world of
bellum omnium contra omnes, war of all against all.13 This is the state of nature, where no
institutions or rules exist. Thus the state of nature is often presented as a condition of
infinite freedoms and zero rights. Each person is free to do as she pleases - take any
13 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Ed. J. C. A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008
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object, inflict any harm on others, and so on. But each person has no rights, and thus has
no right to own property or to be unharmed. One might immediately object to this
scenario on the grounds that it seems to contradict the notion of human rights, rights that
all men and women possess regardless of their circumstances. I think we can accept the
existence of human rights, while denying that they exist in the state of nature by
remembering that the state of nature is not real - it is only a theoretical construct. To
illustrate the importance of this fact, imagine what life might be like if the government
were to collapse. Certainly there would be some chaos, but it would not therefore be a
state of nature. Though the institution of government would be gone, the common
language of morality would remain. Even if people diminished their respect for moral
rules, they would still understand them. Thus in such a scenario, if someone were to
begin killing and enslaving others, he would still understand that he was violating others'
non-institutional rights (and that he deserved to be punished for it). In the state of nature,
the moral and social norms we take for granted simply do not exist. The person in a state
of nature has no notion at all of respecting the well-being of others, and will only help
others insofar as doing so would help himself. We can still believe in human rights, then,
because the state of nature does not, and perhaps even could not, exist.
Out of the universal self-interest of the state of nature emerges a universal
agreement called the social contract. The social contract is obviously not a real document
any more than the state of nature is a real condition, but it is an idea meant to illustrate
how a world full of totally selfish actors could form a moral society. The social contract
takes the infinite freedoms and non-existent rights from the state of nature and shifts the
scales towards rights. Thus the social contract revokes freedoms, such as the freedom to
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kill others, and grants rights, such as the right not to be killed. Rational people will see
that it is in their own self-interest to have the right not to be killed, even if it means giving
up the freedom to kill others. Thus the “terms” of the contract are a set of trade-offs, and
they are determined simply by what is mutually beneficial for all. Those trade-offs are
succinctly embodied by Freud's claim that “civilized man has exchanged a portion of his
possibilities of happiness for a portion of security”.14
With the social contract come rights, and with rights comes the potential for
violation of rights. For the contract to be meaningful, violation of rights must have some
consequences; if there was no punishment for murder, then the illegality of murder would
be meaningless, or almost meaningless. Thus the social contract creates the institution of
punishment. But to define punishment as something that makes rights meaningful is
insufficient. The relationship between violations of rights and punishment is not one of
passive coexistence, but of active response. To simply describe rights as meaningful
because of punishment is too one-dimensional - punishment is also meaningful because
of rights. By looking at the social contract, I will show how rights make punishment
meaningful, and how punishment can “offset” wrongdoing.15
The social contract's view of rights as trade-offs is the key to understanding the
relationship between punishment and rights. Having rights means giving up freedoms,
and giving up freedoms is a negative for the individual. For example, someone might
want to steal a car; in the state of nature, he would be free to take it. The social contract
14 Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 1961
15 For more on “offsetting”, see Leo Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution. Aldershot,
England: Ashgate 2006. pp.33-34
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revokes that freedom, which negatively affects his interests. What offsets this negative is
the right to own property and not have it stolen. Each member of society, then, is
constantly in a state of balance between negative non-freedoms and positive rights.
In a society with laws, being a part of the social contract is not a choice. This is
because everyone in a lawful society benefits from the rights granted by laws, and since
everyone benefits from laws, everyone has a duty to obey them. It should not be said,
however, that the social contract is forced upon the citizen. The very purpose of the social
contract is to model how rational people would agree to rights and laws, even without
explicit consent.
Punishment enters the picture when the social contract is violated. For example,
Walter commits assault. In doing so, he violates his victim's right not to be assaulted - one
of the rights that he himself, as a member of society, has always benefited from. By
breaking the social contract, the essential trade-off of the social contract is upset. In
committing assault, Walter ceases to be negatively affected by the social contract's
revoking of freedoms. The scales, always balancing positive rights and negative nonfreedoms, is unbalanced. Punishment rebalances those scales.
Unbalanced scales are a good way of picturing a very important concept in this
paper - desert. To deserve punishment is to enjoy the benefits of rights, while not bearing
the burden of the duty to respect the rights of others. Punishment is painful, so it adds
weight to the negative side of the scales. The intuitive idea of proportionality in
punishment is made quite clear by this picture. The right to not be killed is a much more
positive effect than the right not to be stolen from, so violating the former upsets the
scales more than the latter. Therefore murder calls for a greater punishment than theft.
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Before continuing my account of punishment, I will address an important
objection to the social contract. The objection is this: even a cursory look at history will
show that social systems are not naturally egalitarian. The rational person does not
necessarily want to share rights with others, often she wants to dominate others. For
example, the 18th century American slave-owner would not agree to the social contract he would want to retain his own rights while granting none to his slaves. So how does the
social contract accurately model what we would rationally choose?
John Rawls famously attempted to defeat this objection in A Theory of Justice.
Rawls refashioned the social contract by adding the concept of the veil of ignorance. For
Rawls, a social contract can only be formulated justly when all parties in the contract are
behind a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance is a state of not knowing one's future
state in society. Countless characteristics have historically allowed some in society to
dominate others: gender, race, religion, knowledge, strength, age, reputation, honor,
wealth, and charm, to name a few. Behind the veil of ignorance, no one knows which
and how much of these characteristics each will possess. Even more of an abstraction
than the state of nature, Rawls calls this state the original position. Think back to the
slave-owner - not knowing whether he (or she) would own slaves or be one of the slaves,
he would, solely out of self-interest, decide that slavery ought to be outlawed. Like so
many other important concepts in ethics, as diverse as The Golden Rule (“Do unto others
as you would have them do unto you”), Buddhism's metaphysics of non-self, and
utilitarianism, the original position is meant to eliminate the dualism of moral subject and
object, eliminate bias, and make self-interest and other-interest one and the same.
The original position is an important adjustment to the theory of the social
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contract. I think it is clear prima facie that the inherent impartiality of the original
position moralizes the social contract in a way that formulating the social contract via
state of nature does not. I do not think that Rawls' formulation of the social contract can
provide a complete account of social justice, since it may fail to account for just
redistribution, but it is nonetheless a powerful blueprint for making just decisions. It
might be argued that it is impossible to think from behind the veil of ignorance, since no
one can completely abstract their thoughts from their own contingent characteristics.
Certainly the original position is neither real nor possible, but it is enough to say that it
represents an ideal, and that ideal is still intelligible enough to follow.
The social contract is meant to reconcile the competing values of individual
autonomy and state authority - by making rights a function of rational decision,
individuals autonomously agree to a universal set of rights and laws. Using the social
contract, I can now more thoroughly defend my claim that the state has standing to
punish because of the consent of the people.
Kant famously claimed that “even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the
consent of all its members... the last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be
executed, so that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not
cling to the people”.16 The framework of the social contract allows us to understand what
Kant meant. An unpunished murderer has benefited from laws, without paying the price
of breaking them, so he deserves punishment. And we can now explain how the state has
the standing to inflict it.
I have just explained the relationship between rights and punishment. Because
16 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Kt 6: 333
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these two concepts are inseparable, agreeing to rights means agreeing to punishment. The
individual agrees to the social contract in order to gain rights, so he also agrees to
punishment. Therefore the state has standing to punish citizens because citizens consent
to their own punishment. This position seems at first absurd. Why would a criminal
consent to be punished? Surely she would prefer to commit a crime, then go unpunished.
But the criminal, as a citizen, already has implicitly agreed to the social contract, and thus
consented to punishment.17 The criminal's own rights are granted by the social contract,
and because of the veil of ignorance, she cannot selectively grant herself rights while
denying them to others. The nature of the original position is such that it is rational to
apply all rights universally, even to oneself. Therefore, while a criminal would probably
not explicitly consent to being punished, the consent is implicit.
At this point, I will remind the reader that the social contract is a model, not a
reality. The social contract is necessary, however, to justify the state's standing to violate
individual autonomy. But the social contract is not does not justify punishment a priori.
The reason it is able to function as justification is that the environment and actors in the
social contract resemble those in reality. For example, contingent factors like limited
resources and susceptibility to injury must be actual so that the social contract is an
functional model of rational human choices. In the next section of this thesis, I will take a
deeper look at what these factors are, and what they mean for the justificatory power of
17 This idea of implicit consent to be punished has its roots in Hegel's The Philosophy of
Right, in which Hegel famously defended the criminal's “right to be punished”. I think
it is less peculiar, however, to call the criminal's assent to punishment “consent” rather
than a “right”.
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the social contract in a real-world context. I will argue that real-world conditions do not
match the necessary conditions for the social contract to work.
Before continuing, I will note that my critique of state standing to punish is based
on the social contract, so one could dismiss my argument by rejecting the social contract.
For example, one might claim that the goal of law is not to satisfy rational self-interest. It
is commonly thought, for example, that government should not only protect individuals
from each other, but also help the disadvantaged in society. It could be argued, then, that
there is more than mutual self-interest at the heart of laws - there are also irreducible
moral principles. This would be a fundamentally different view of law. I have already
argued that the original position would lead to laws that help the disadvantaged, but I do
not want to defend the social contract against every other conception of social justice. I
will readily admit that there is more to social justice and state principles than the social
contract can explain. But I will limit my discussion to the social contract because even
adherents of other doctrines of social justice should accept the social contract as at least
presenting a foundation for justice. Even if humans are essentially violent and selfish, the
social contract still presents a powerful conception of social justice. Therefore the social
contract should be acceptable because it assumes no special moral character in humans,
and it derives justice from the simple building blocks of fairness and impartiality. I think
there is no reason, then, to reject the contractarian political theory that underlies this
paper.
5. Objective vs. Subjective Rights in an Unfair Society
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls explores, at great length, the results of his thought
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experiment regarding an the original position behind a veil of ignorance.18 He ultimately
decides that the rational person in the original position would develop a vision of “justice
as fairness”, a concept constituted by two principles of justice that would make up the
social contract. The first principle is that “each person is to have an equal right to the
most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of
liberties for others” (Rawls 53). This principle is the one with which this paper has been
thus far concerned, since the violation of basic liberties is what calls for punishment. But
my argument in the latter part of this paper will be as much concerned with Rawls'
second principle of justice, the difference principle. The difference principle determines
the extent to which economic inequalities are justified. According to this principle,
economic inequalities are justified only if those inequalities benefit those least well-off in
society. For example, the relative wealth of a successful entrepreneur is justified if his
business or product improves wealth of all of society. The veil of ignorance makes the
fair distribution of wealth the rational choice, just as it does for fair distribution of rights.
So how does Rawls's second principle of justice relate to punishment and
standing? It may at first seem that punishment exists entirely in the moral realm, which is
encompassed by the first principle of justice, and that the second principle of justice has
no relation to punishment. But basic individual rights (the first principle) and economic
fairness (the second principle) do overlap, and that overlap is in the realm of social
justice. State punishment, as we have seen, cannot be justified in the same way as
punishment between individuals can be; with its justification in the social contract, state
punishment is conceptually rooted in social justice. Thus both of Rawls' principles of
18 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000.
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justice are important to state punishment.
Just like other issues in social justice, state punishment is pulled from both sides
by moral and economic concerns. This is clear in the case of familiar issues of social
justice like worker's rights, minimum wage, welfare, healthcare, and equality of
opportunity. In each case, finding what is just is a matter of balancing the rights of the
individual and the economic costs of doing so. In the case of punishment, it may be true
that the state needs to balance giving criminals what they deserve and the costs of doing
so. But the problem I am interested in is more subtle. What I want to look at is not the
economic costs of punishment, but the economic effects on the moral aspects of
punishment.
Without further delay, here is my claim: modern American society (along with
many other societies, to be sure) does not satisfy Rawls' second principle of justice; in
other words, the division of wealth is unjust. This unjust distribution of wealth
marginalizes segments of society, not just financially, but also morally. Such an unjust
society does not fit the model of the social contract, and thus the contractarian
justification of state punishment fails. Therefore state punishment in our society is unjust.
This paper is a theoretical, not sociological, investigation of punishment, so I will
say relatively little to defend my claims about the unjust distribution of wealth. But some
brief comments should, I think, be made, and will perhaps be compelling to the reader.
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world. This rate is nearly 8
times that of France and Germany, and 11 times that of Japan.19 Blacks represent 12.4%
19 The Sentencing Project, “New Incarceration Figures”
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_newfigures.pdf
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of the U.S. Population, but commit 36.5% percent of murders20, 39.4% of violent crimes,
and 30.1% of property crimes21; and constitute 38.2% of the prison population. Of black
males in their late 20's, 11.7% are currently incarcerated.22 The disproportionately high
levels of black crime and incarceration are even higher among the poor and uneducated,
though blacks are overrepresented in so-called white collar crime as well. These statistics
represent a crisis in American society. I will simply assume for this paper that this
relationship of race and crime is not coincidental, or biological in origin, but that it
indicates a demographic group that is to a considerable extent socially alienated and
economically marginalized.
If this is true, then justifying state punishment becomes very problematic. The
reason why can be found by looking at the important character of rights as trade-offs, and
punishment as rebalancing the scales of duty and freedom. The social contract
characterizes justice as fairness; without fairness, the social contract achieves little. Thus
when we talk about individuals with a set of freedoms and a set of duties, those sets are
identical for everyone.23 Insofar as this is legally the case, the justification of state
20 http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/expanded_information/homicide.html
21 http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/table_43.html
22 Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2006”
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf
23 It is possible that some persons do have a claim to special rights which would be
meaningless to others. For example, the biological differences between men and
women might necessitate some special men's or women's rights. As long as these
rights would be derived from the process of the social contract, they are not
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punishment is not in trouble. But while the set of rights and freedoms is objectively the
same for all individuals, not all duties and freedoms are subjectively actual.
What is the distinction between “actual” rights and rights that only exist legally or
abstractly? Put simply, objective legal rights are subjectively actual rights only when they
are able to be exercised. The right to own property means little, at least immediately, to a
man who owns nothing, and the right to free speech means little to a man to whom no
one will listen. Such rights, while legally real, would not in these cases be subjectively
actual. The same can be true for duties to respect the rights of others. A man who despises
violence is not at all burdened by his duty not to harm others, and a man with vast wealth
is untroubled by his duty to respect others' property. These duties would, again, be
subjectively non-actual. When I referred earlier to a demographic group that is “socially
alienated and economically marginalized”, I suggested that this group would
problematize the justification of state punishment. The reason is that a marginalized
group in society can have the same objective rights as the rest of society while enjoying
fewer subjective rights.24
Consider again the contractarian justification of punishment: When a person
violates an other's rights, that person ceases to be burdened by their duty under the social
problematic.
24 There is also the worrying fact that some groups are objectively disadvantaged. For
example, punishment for crack cocaine, whose use is much more common among
black communities, is much more severe than punishment for powder cocaine. This
arguably represents institutional racism - an obvious injustice. I am concerned in this
thesis, however, with the standing (or lack thereof) of just institutions.
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contract, while continuing to benefit from their rights. In the absence of the burden of
duty, punishment is needed to rebalance the scales. It should be clear how a lack of
subjective rights disrupts this rationale. Consider, for illustration, the sort of person to
whom this argument applies. A young, uneducated black male with an absent father, no
positive role models or opportunities for constructive activities, and a social environment
in which a future in prison seems inevitable; let's call him Thomas. I don't want to delve
deeply into the psychology of such an individual, but it is important to look at his set of
subjective rights. Legally, of course, Thomas has the same rights as anyone else. But his
legal freedoms are in contrast to his feeling of freedom. He feels threatened by, and
threatens, the powerful and affluent in society; and coming from a broken home, he does
not aspire to having a positive family environment in his future, nor does he feel that he
could ever have a legitimate means of income.
The justification of state punishment seems not to fit Thomas. Compare his
subjective experience of duty to that of a white, affluent, well-educated individual; let's
call him Henry. Thomas has a duty not to steal from others, even though it seems
impossible for him to find a secure or comfortable job. Furthermore, Thomas feels little
moral duty not to steal, since the feelings between him and the wealthy are characterized
more by hostility than solidarity. Henry, on the other hand, feels certain that his financial
future will be bright, so he feels no compulsion to seek out extralegal sources of income,
and since he identifies much more with society's values than Thomas does, it would in
fact be painful for him to steal from others. To say that Thomas and Henry are members
of the same social contract would be ridiculous. Rights under the social contract are
supposed to be trade-offs, but it seems that they are not so for either person. Thomas has
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an objective duty not to break the law, but the physical and psychological barriers he
faces limit his freedom. Henry is not at all inclined to commit crimes, but he certainly has
benefited much from his rights. So while the social contract ought to work to Henry and
Thomas's mutual advantage, it seems in fact that it is simply working to protect Henry
from Thomas, with little cost to Henry and little benefit to Thomas.
When the contractarian justification of punishment is functioning properly, it
seems paradoxical that the criminal would consent to her own punishment. But the
paradox is not real because the sort of consent at play is not actual, given consent, but
consent that is implicit in the dictates of justice under the social contract. For Thomas,
however, the paradox becomes real. Thomas, like a criminal in a just society, would not
explicitly agree to be punished, but in his case justice does not present any implicit
consent either. Since society has not ultimately benefited Thomas, we cannot make a
fundamental contractarian claim of justice - that he owes some duty to society. Therefore
the state does not have standing to punish Thomas.
This result does, I think, agree with our intuitions. It should not be surprising that
there cannot be a just justice system in an unjust society. What is even worse is the
possibility that the justice system is not only lacking in standing, but also complicit in the
unjust conditions of society. Thomas is not a member of the social contract because
society limits his freedoms in both physical and psychological ways. It seems possible
that the justice system could very well be fueling the “us and them” mentality that is so
important to the psychological elements of injustice of society. To a demographic in
society that is far overrepresented in prison populations, the justice system itself may
seem to be an instrument of systemic injustice. While I do want to reiterate that this
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paper is not meant to pursue psychology or sociology, the psychological impact of the
institution of punishment is relevant insofar as it affects the subjective rights of persons.
Part of the reason that the defense of retributivism in this paper is important is that
the issue I have just raised is not intelligible to the consequentialist. Granted, the
consequentialist would probably see the negative societal and economic effects of overcriminalization and racial victimization, but seeing the issue from that perspective fails to
capture the fundamental moral problem with which I am concerned: standing. The state
needs some justification to be able to interfere with people's lives. For example, watching
Reality TV may be a waste of time, but the government ought not to prevent people from
doing it. This is not necessarily because of a consequentialist calculation, but because the
government does not automatically have the right to limit people's autonomy. If the
government were to ban Reality TV, everyone might be better off, but even so, people
would not rationally want a government that limits what they can and cannot watch. The
only reason the state has the right to punish is that people would rationally choose to live
in a society where people are protected from one another. In the actual world, this choice
would not be rational, since Rawls' second principle of justice is not satisfied.
A retributivist approach to the question of state punishment yields a much more
complicated picture than a consequentialist one. In consequentialism, every factor in a
moral question can simply be plugged into the moral calculation, and the question is
ultimately answered when all factors are considered. Retributivism, much more at home
within deonotological ethical doctrines, is much less suited to resolving moral dilemmas,
since it is less clear how to weigh competing moral principles against each other. Thus far
in this paper, I have articulated two competing principles: retributivist desert, and the
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state's standing to punish. The problem is this - if someone commits a crime, and the
crime is wrong, then she deserves punishment. But due to unfair social conditions, the
state does not have standing to punish. It seems, then, that punishing this criminal would
be unjustified, yet it would be wrong for her to go unpunished.
It is tempting, then, to fall back on consequentialist ethics, since consequentialism
can take a quantitative approach to the problem. This temptation, however, should be
resisted. The consequentialist approach does simplify our ethical answers, but it also runs
the risk of simplifying ethical questions.25 If we were to revert to consequentialism at this
point in the discussion, we would simply decide which injustice did greater harm to
society: unfair punishment, or leaving offenders unpunished. I think it will be more
fruitful, however, to stick to the ethical tools we have been using, and take a deeper look
at the dilemma. One aspect of the question that has thus far remained more or less
25 The so-called “problem of dirty hands” is a problem in ethics that supports this claim.
The problem is that it is possible, and perhaps even virtuous, to feel guilty about doing
the right thing. Presumably, if someone were to kill one person to save many, or
torture a prisoner in order to extract information that will end a war, those actions
would be justified. But it might also seem monstrous for a person to do one of those
things and feel no guilt. The problem of dirty hands is especially paradoxical for
consequentialist ethics, since any moral problem can be calculated to be simply right
or wrong. Deontological ethics might have a harder time deciding whether such
actions are ultimately right or wrong, but this seems to capture our moral intuitions
more accurately, since the problem of dirty hands shows that our moral conscience
cannot simplify a moral problem the way a consequentialist calculation can.
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unexamined is the question of agency. This issue relates to punishment on both a social
and individual level, so it should be helpful to examine.
6. Moral Agency and Standing to Punish
Only a moral agent can be punished. A dog, for example, is not a moral agent; it
lacks the intelligence to consider the moral consequences of its actions, and it is unable to
speak the same moral language as humans. Therefore a dog cannot be held morally
responsible for its actions; one can discipline, but not blame or punish a dog. Thus moral
agency and punishment on the individual level are clearly linked, but what about
punishment on the social level?
My critique of the state's standing to punish can be construed as a denial of a
moral agency. Consider an analogy: remember John and Jane? Jane has been unfaithful to
John, and he wishes to punish her by confronting her publicly and humiliating her. This
time, I'm not interested in Paul's interference in the conflict, but another possible
outcome. Jane believes she doesn't deserve John's punishment, and tearfully tells him,
“you made me do it!” Jane is claiming that John, through his distant and unaffectionate
behavior, drove Jane to infidelity. But there is something wrong with this argument - Jane
is denying herself moral agency. Rather than taking responsibility for her actions, she is
saying that the negative treatment she received from John caused her to stray from their
relationship. In broad terms, Jane is illuminating the tension between determinism and
moral responsibility.26 But her appeal to determinism is opportunistic - one cannot pick
and choose when one is and is not a moral agent.
How is this case analogous to state punishment? Recall that I said that the state's
26 See Libertarianism: A Defense of Free Will, Richard Taylor
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standing is unproblematic insofar as all citizens share the same objective rights. With fair
distribution of rights, the contractarian justification of punishment is functional. But I
argued that unfair social conditions render the distribution of subjective rights unfair,
which voids the contractarian justification of punishment. This claim, that society grants
fewer subjective rights to some than to others, could be analogous to Jane claiming that
John left her no choice. Jane may have felt that she had no subjective duty to be faithful,
despite her objective duty in the relationship, since she was treated unfairly. So we could
criticize the idea of subjective rights the same way - just as Jane was denying herself
moral agency, the claiming that there is a gap between objective and subjective rights
may be claiming that some members of society lack moral agency.
I am indeed skeptical of the idea of full, unobstructed agency. Michael Moore
considers such skepticism, and admits that “...we certainly have never been subject to the
exact same stresses and motivations as [the criminal]. Therefore it may be tempting to
withhold from [the criminal] the benefit each of us gives himself or herself: the benefit of
being the subjective seat of a will that, although caused, is nonetheless capable of both
choice and responsibility,” (Moore 148). In other words, when we consider someone like
Thomas, my example of someone who is marginalized in society, it is tempting to say
that the causal forces to which he is subjected prevent him from having the same full
moral agency which we believe ourselves to have, despite the fact that we too are
subjected to some causal forces.
This claim is key to my argument, since this lack of moral agency results is what
transforms Thomas' objective rights into a smaller set of subjective rights, which in turn
is what causes the justification of state punishment to collapse. Moore goes on to reject
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such a position, however:
Such discrimination is a temptation to be resisted, because it is no virtue. It
is elitist and condescending toward others not to grant them the same
responsibility and desert you grant to yourself. Admittedly, there are
excuses the benefit of which others as well as you may avail themselves...
[but] to refuse to grant [the criminal] the same responsibility and desert as
you would grant yourself is... a refusal to admit that the rest of humanity
shares with us that which makes us most distinctively human, our capacity
to will and reason- and thus to be and do evil. Far from evincing fellowfeeling and the allowing of others to participate in our moral life, it
excludes them as less than persons. (Moore 148-149)
If my claims about subjective rights are indeed “elitism masquerading as egalitarianism”,
then my argument is in peril. If Moore is right, then my argument may be similar to my
argument that you cannot punish a dog. Because dogs are not moral agents, we should not
hold them morally accountable for their actions. I do not wish to make a parallel claim
about marginalized people in society, because I don't want to portray such people as subhuman. To defend my argument, I will have to show that my claims about subjective
rights do not demean the moral status of criminals, and that my claims about subjective
rights are objectively valid, and not elitist moralism.
I will begin my defense by pointing out that Moore's theoretical treatment of
punishment is focused on punishment between individuals. After all, the quote above is
specifically addressing the case of an individual murderer. His words are potent in the
context of a monstrous individual like the one he discusses, but they are less convincing
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in a broad social context. I am concerned, in this paper, about the dangers of generalizing
punishment's justification from an individual to a political and social level. Moore
dismisses such concerns:
“[None] of the proper liberal worries that should on occasion stay our hand
should lead us to eschew retributive justice when we set up institutions.
The main such worry, the preservation of individual autonomy, argues in
favor of retributive institutions, not against them. We respect someone's
autonomy when we punish him only because he deserves it, not because
his punishment is useful to others' welfare” (Moore 150).
Moore is right to point out that the retributive rationale respects the autonomy of the
individual more than that of the consequentialist. But when Moore moves from individual
to institutional punishment, he looks only at the moral side - if it's right to punish one
person for these reasons, it's right to punish everyone for these reasons. He fails to look at
the social side.
When expanding retributive justice into an institution, that institution should not
look at justice the same way an individual should. If I were to catch a thief in the act of
stealing my car, and the thief defended herself, “I'm from a poor neighborhood, I didn't
go to school, and my parents-” I'd tell her to stop right there. None of those things have
any bearing on my right not to have my car stolen. They are not so relevant in
punishment between individuals. But they are relevant for an institution of punishment.
The state has a responsibility to take a broad view of the criminal as a person, not just as
a wrongdoer.
By now, the social sciences have abandoned the fiction of the person in a vacuum.
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Surely when we talk about one person, we can only talk about one agent, but that agency
is constantly conditioned and affected in manifold ways. I will not defend this claim
scientifically, but I think it is intuitively clear based on the connection, which I have
already pointed to, between social status and crime. Surely Moore would admit that
socioeconomic factors have a huge influence on how likely one is to commit crimes. But
Moore can, and does, admit this while maintaining his argument. As I have pointed out,
this is arguably a reasonable position when it comes to punishment between individuals.
But his charge of elitism does not seem nearly as righteous in a social context.
If a group in society is driven to commit more crimes than others due to a lack of
wealth and a collective complex of victimization and alienation, is it elitist to claim that
the state has a moral problem in punishing that group? I don't think so, especially
considering the fact that the institution of punishment may even be deepening the rift in
society causing the problem. Should we really be systematically punishing the victims in
society, and congratulating ourselves for treating them as equals? It is not at all
contradictory to respect the moral agency of a person, while remaining sympathetic to the
fact that actions are shaped by causal forces. It is possible to maintain this position by
excusing.
In neglecting the role of excuses, Moore overlooks a basic aspect of moral
responsibility. In excusing, we can hold people responsible, but choose not to punish
them because their agency was undermined by causal forces. Thus we can accept that a
person has full moral agency, and is morally responsible for his actions, while deciding
that, on final analysis, he does not deserve to be punished. In cases in which those causal
forces that undermine agency are caused by the would-be punisher, it seems especially
41

unfitting not to excuse.
Because of the retributivist theory to which I subscribe, I do think that criminals
are, causal forces aside, morally responsible for their actions. But Moore himself admits
that the retributivist need not be “monomaniacally” focused on punishing the deserving.
Treating punishment of the deserving as an inherent good does not exclude the existence
of other goods. In the case of state punishment, an institution of punishment should exist
to punish the deserving, but it should not do so if it comes at the cost of a just society.
Just as there is inherent value in punishing the deserving, I think there is also value in
having a fair society. As I have argued, the two go hand in hand, since the contractarian
justification of state punishment only works in a fair society.
There is little more I can do in objecting to Moore's argument. Moore's accusation
of elitism is less a deductive argument, and more of an aesthetic claim. Doubting the full
moral agency of persons is, according to Moore, aesthetically ugly, since it seems to
demean basic human dignity. I cannot object to an aesthetic evaluation of my argument,
but I think I have shown that Moore's position can be at least as ugly as mine. In rejecting
any view shy of absolute, fully accountable agency, Moore ignores the role of excuses,
and is guilty of the monomania which he insists need not be characteristic of
retributivists.
But I want to avoid characterizing my view as a mere aesthetic preference over
Moore's. My critique of state standing is essentially rooted in the distinction between
objective and subjective rights. In an unfair society, equal objective rights fail to translate
to equal subjective rights. The distinction between objective and subjective rights is not at
all aesthetic: An objective right from which one gains nothing, or an objective duty that
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costs nothing, is not subjectively actual. This is the process by which the moral agency of
marginalized groups is undermined, and it should lead us, as a matter of morality, not
aesthetics, to excuse the wrongs of those groups.
7. What it Means if State Punishment is Unjustified
The result of my argument is not a simple conclusion but a dilemma. On one
hand, retributivism demands punishment of the guilty. On the other, the necessary
conditions for the state to have standing to punish are not present, so the state ought to
excuse the guilty. I will recount how I reached this conclusion.
This thesis began by showing the intuitive appeal of retributivism, which makes it
preferable to consequentialism. The keys to this appeal are that retributivism (1) is based
on retributive feelings, which are our central heuristic guide to recognizing wrongdoing,
and (2) that retributivism better captures the fundamental character of punishment – that
wrongdoing creates a reason to punish.
I went on to observe that the intuitive idea of standing is only intelligible, or
important, to the retributivist. By exploring both retributivist justification of punishment
and the concept of standing, I presented the tools to answer two essential questions about
punishment: “why do we punish?”, and “why do we punish?”.
I then used the social contract to show how the state can have standing to punish,
and combined this contractarian justification of state punishment with the concept of
objective and subjective rights to show how the state lacks standing to punish in an unfair
society.
So, retributivism commits us to punishing the guilty, but the state lacks standing
to punish; thus the dilemma just mentioned. Of course, this dilemma only arises for the
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retributivist, but it would be no solution to abandon retributivism in favor of
consequentialism. I settled initially on retributivism because of its greater intuitive
appeal, so I am committed to facing the moral problems it raises.
It is far beyond the scope and spirit of this paper to propose a solution to this
dilemma, but we can probably say with some confidence that abolishing the institution of
punishment would do more harm, and serve justice less, than it would help. The more
reasonable direction to go in order to solve this problem, then, is to cultivate a fairer
society. I have already granted that, for the most part, our society is fair insofar as it
grants all citizens the same objective rights. But, as I have argued, the socioeconomic
inequalities in society decrease the subjective rights of some groups in society, and thus
erode the basic equality essential to having just institutions. Thus until we live in a truly
fair society – a society in which all citizens are treated not just “equally” but “as equals”27
- the institution of punishment will remain in a moral gray area.

27 Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism”, Liberalism and Its Critics. New York: NYUP, 1984
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